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INTRODUCTION 
In the final decade of the nineteenth century, Americans were riven by an 
argument. The argument concerned the nature of money. The question itself, the 
nature of money, is multifaceted, but an argument is experienced as two-sided. 
The basic conflict was between advocates of gold and silver: the former clinging 
to the gold standard, the latter agitating for bimetallism and the free coinage of 
silver. The two sides conducted the argument in two interrelated languages: 
politics and economics. Law was a central component for each. Looking back with 
the perspective of an intervening century, it is tempting to ask who had the better 
argument, who was right, who understood more deeply the phenomenon of 
monetary circulation. But indulging that temptation would enact an assumption, 
according to which an argument is a contest of fact finding and reason, an exercise 
in discovery of an existing truth. Of course, it is that, but it is more as well. Such 
an assumption denies the generative power, the worldmaking force, of 
argumentation and political discourse. And so, there is another way to follow an 
argument, to track its productive effects. 
 
*  Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University. Most of the work on this article was done while I was the 
Lillian Gollay Knaffel Fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Studies at Harvard University, 
and I am grateful to the institute for its generous support and to the fellows for their patience, 
suggestions, and general good cheer. Special thanks for excellent research assistance to Radcliffe 
research partners Amanda Hameline and Cyrus Kornfeld. I thankfully acknowledge support from the 
American Council of Learned Societies. For comments and discussions on previous drafts, I am 
especially indebted to Morton Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy, Orlando Segura, Christine Desan, Russ 
Rymer, Ravit Reichman, Elaine Auyoung, Peter Galison, Ariela Gross, Jerry Frug, Steve Marglin, 
Chris Tomlins, Sven Beckert, Shai Lavi, and Yishai Blank. 
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There were winners and losers, but the argument was not settled 
intellectually. Indeed, winning the argument, or so I will claim, meant shifting the 
ground upon which the argument could be carried forward; the new ground 
would become the frame for a new discourse of money. In telling the story of an 
argument, there is always a temptation to intervene, to say who was right, to 
intellectualize the argument and interject today’s science. But for the most part, I 
would like to trace the argument otherwise, highlighting the way the conflict laid 
the groundwork for a wholly different politics of money and a new role for 
economic science and monetary expertise. 
Before engaging the argument over the nature of money directly, it seems 
necessary to account, at least provisionally, for how such an argument could 
become the central focus of political conflict. We are accustomed to imagining 
that political conflict revolves around the distribution of resources in society, 
where resources are conceptualized capaciously, including not only material goods, 
but also symbolic goods and somewhat more amorphous conceptions like power. 
Groups, under this conception, struggle over material and nonmaterial interests. 
So it seems natural to see capital in a struggle with labor over the surplus 
generated by production; sectional interests famously divide the United States 
(typically, West and South versus Northeast); groups engaged in different modes 
of production (agriculture vs. manufacturing) struggle for economic arrangements 
to their advantage. Thus, for instance, it seems perfectly natural along such lines to 
understand the tariff as a political issue. At the same time, we are also accustomed 
to the idea that some issues (at certain times) only mask (and sometimes thinly) 
the underlying political interests motivating the conflict. For example, we have 
grown up with the idea that the conflict over federalism and states’ rights was (at 
least for certain periods of U.S. history) a cover for the issue of race.1 
But the nature of money? The backing of the currency? At first glance, these 
appear an odd focus for political conflict. For those not steeped in the discussion, 
it must seem strange that such a question could form the heart of a struggle. One 
way to answer this puzzlement is to translate the money question into familiar 
political divisions and some of the best analyses of the politics of the conflict have 
done just that, arguing that gold favored the industrial East over the agricultural 
West and South.2 But that understanding does not account for the transition in 
politics itself, through which money disappears as a central issue experienced 
politically. This article sets out to explain that disappearance, the vanishing of the 
experience of money as a political issue. It thus assumes that we know the 
outcome: gold and silver advocates fought an extended battle culminating in the 
presidential election of 1896. Gold advocates won the election, and within a 
 
1. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE 6162 (2007). 
2. RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 18771900, at 355 (2000). 
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congressional term the money issue had finally quieted down, almost completely. 
In 1900, Congress passed the Gold Standard Act with nothing of the energy that 
drove the “battle of the standards,” and within a decade the money question had 
been reduced to a discussion of banking reform. It was as important as ever 
economically, but quiet, if not dead, politically. The question for this article is how 
that happened: What created the conditions of possibility for taking money off the 
political table? 
The answer, I will suggest, has a great deal to do with law and, in particular, 
with the role political actors ascribe to the law in their social arrangements. To 
preface the argument, imagine two radically opposed views about the role of law. 
According to one view, law is the means through which government directs its 
own officers and its citizens: legislation winds the machinery of government and 
sets it in motion. A community, through its representatives, creates its social 
arrangements, implements its ideals by legislating, and then executes them through 
the agencies of government. According to another view, law is a set of nearly 
untouchable norms that serve as the background for free individual action. 
Government indeed has a role to play, according to this view, but only in 
vindicating rights that precede its intervention into the relations among 
individuals. Legislation, in this view, is a secondary and marginal issue, meant to 
fine tune when problems of administration arise: the basics of law are custom 
created, tradition bound, and precedent preserved. These views of law are familiar 
enough to students of jurisprudence as well as to political philosophers. But it is 
rarely, if ever, suggested that the battle of the standards in the 1890s was a contest 
of jurisprudence.3 In essence, I will argue that both the political and the economic 
disputes of the period were actually engaged in a conflict over the nature of law, 
and that the results of that jurisprudential battle shifted the ground of economic 
and political discourse for decades to come. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This section lays out a minimalist picture of the background to the argument 
over money. The goal here is not to canvass a significant literature on the period, 
but rather to offer just enough context to make the argument to follow intelligible. 
In particular, I will point to why the 1890s and especially the period between 1893 
and 1897 was a bad time for many people in the United States. The key to these 
bad times was the price decline afflicting industrialized economies including the 
United States from the early 1870s through the 1890s. And the focal point for 
 
3. A very recent work that comes close to this argument is GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE 
TRAGEDY OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN (2011). Magliocca’s engaging new book argues that Bryan’s 
constitutional vision was so threatening to established forces that the specter of his success unified 
and strengthened the opposition to populism and the unified opposition successfully blocked reform 
for decades. However, Magliocca’s treatment of Bryan and populism is nearly silent on the money 
question.  
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dealing with price declines was the money question. 
It was a bad time to be a farmer. Prices of agricultural products had 
plummeted since their post-Civil War highs. Wheat saw a peak of nearly $3.00 a 
bushel in 1866, sold for $1.40 a bushel in 1875, and was down to $0.56 a bushel in 
1894. Corn went from $0.46 a bushel in the early 1870s to $0.10 a bushel in 1890, 
half its production cost—so low that it was apparently often used for fuel rather 
than sold. Cotton lost half its 1870s value by the early 1890s. Declining 
agricultural prices resulted from increased farm acreage in production (made 
possible by extensive growth in railroads), and increased competition from abroad. 
But the farmers’ taxes and their mortgages were payable in nominally constant 
dollars. “The farmers were trapped by debt and market glut.”4 
It was a bad time to be a laborer. Wages had not dropped along with prices 
from 1873 to 1892, but from 1892 until past the end of the depression in 1898 
wages declined significantly. Worse than that, unemployment skyrocketed, 
reaching close to a fifth of the urban workforce in 1893 and 1894; it was still at 
about fifteen percent in 1896.5 The threat of losing a job or having wages forced 
down was palpable, and the situation exacerbated labor strife that had been 
prevalent since the mid-1880s and had increasingly been met with organized 
violence, whether from the state or private capitalist armies. The failure of the 
massive Pullman railway strike, the upholding of Eugene Debs’s contempt 
conviction, and injunctions to bar strikes were sources of demoralization at the 
least.6 Even if you weren’t a labor organizer, it was also a difficult time to be a 
progressive reformer. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Income Tax 
Act of 1894 were progressive victories. But the joy was short-lived, as the 
Supreme Court took the teeth out of the former and invalidated the latter.7  
Perhaps less predictably, it was also a fairly bad time to be a capitalist. 
Manufacturing productivity growth was close to flat from 1884 to 1894, while 
wages held steady in nominal terms (rising in real terms, because prices were 
declining) for most of that period. With real wages rising faster than productivity, 
profits were shrinking. Competition was intense, and if his business was funded 
through debt, an entrepreneur faced difficulties analogous to those facing the 
 
4. DOUGLAS W. STEEPLES & DAVID O. WHITTEN, DEMOCRACY IN DESPERATION: THE 
DEPRESSION OF 1893, at 16 (1998); see also MARGARET G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 198 (1970). 
5. See CHARLES HOFFMANN, THE DEPRESSION OF THE NINETIES: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 
10810 (1970); see also STEEPLES & WHITTEN, supra note 4, at 50. 
6. For an account of the defeat of the strikes, see H. W. BRANDS, THE RECKLESS DECADE: 
AMERICA IN THE 1890S, at 14060 (2002). 
7. On the Supreme Court in antitrust, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 18701960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992). On the income tax, see 
ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX, 18611913 (1993). For an inclusive account of Supreme Court intervention, see 
MAGLIOCCA, supra note 3, at 69–97. 
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farmer: prices of output declined precipitously, while fixed payments were payable 
in nominal, constant dollars. James Livingston has argued that capitalists had 
“good reason to fear the future,” because “capital’s share of national income was 
declining as real costs for new fixed capital were rising,” and the capitalists did not 
yet have the “idiom in which to explain or legitimate their unilateral control of 
production and so to make effective their claim to a reasonable share of national 
income.” In other words, capitalists were not only searching for ways to avoid 
competition and squeeze more out of their workers, they were looking for a 
language in which to justify their authority.8 
So the question arises, was anyone thriving? The answer is that aside from 
people with steady jobs and fixed wages (perhaps government employees), there 
was one significant group doing well: holders of government bonds. And among 
the most significant bondholders were the national banks.9 National banks, 
organized through the Banking Act of 1863, were permitted to issue notes valued 
at up to ninety percent of their government bond holdings. Thus, if a national 
bank wanted to issue notes as part of its business, it was required to hold bonds. 
Selling originally at par, the bonds turned out to be excellent investments. In 
general, creditors who had solvent debtors enjoyed the steady appreciation of the 
dollar. But that steady appreciation was a significant complicating factor in 
handling the money supply. 
The money supply and its complicated relationship to the gold standard 
require a brief independent explanation. Legislative attempts to take the United 
States off the gold standard during the 1880s were unsuccessful, but not for a lack 
of persistence. “The only factor that prevented the United States from switching 
from gold to silver or paper currency as the monetary standard was the 
unflinching position of the executive branch.”10 Being “on the gold standard” 
meant the government stood ready to redeem its paper currency in gold. Since 
resumption in 1879, Treasury practice had been to maintain a gold reserve of at 
least $100 million in order to be able to redeem outstanding greenbacks when 
necessary. Gold came into the Treasury either when the government sold bonds, 
or when people paid customs duties. The gold standard thus imposed a measure 
of discipline on the federal budget: temporary deficits could be offset by bond 
issues, but a weakening of revenues (because of a decline in intake from the tariff )  
or an increase in expenditures could threaten the Treasury’s ability to maintain 
adequate reserves. In 1890, silver agitation failed to rescind the gold standard, but 
succeeded in passing the Sherman Silver Purchase Act which compelled the 
government to buy over four million ounces of silver monthly. The purchases 
themselves exerted some pressure on the Treasury by increasing spending; but 
 
8. JAMES LIVINGSTON, ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 3648 (1986). 
9. BENSEL, supra note 2, at 371. 
10. Id. 
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much more importantly, the policy created uncertainty about whether the United 
States would eventually leave the gold standard altogether. That uncertainty made 
investors nervous and was apparently one factor leading many foreign investors to 
withdraw capital from the United States in the early 1890s.11 
A weak trade situation, declining revenues from the tariff, and jittery 
investors pulling out their gold resulted in repeated threats to the Treasury reserve 
through the early 1890s. When the Panic of 1893 broke out, President Grover 
Cleveland believed he could stem it by restoring confidence through a repeal of 
the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. He called a special summer session of Congress, 
and eventually succeeded in repealing the Act in November. However, within a 
year the gold reserve was again sinking critically, dipping to sixty-eight million 
dollars in mid-January 1895, and to forty-five million dollars by the end of the 
month. Cleveland failed to secure authorization for a new bond issue, and finally 
turned to a private syndicate led by J.P. Morgan, which arranged for a placement 
of bonds with a guarantee that the gold to purchase them would come from 
abroad, and would stay in the United States.12 The syndicated bond issue 
succeeded in bolstering the Treasury reserve, but created an absolute storm 
politically, with heated charges of the corrupting influence of banking on 
governance. Cleveland had saved the gold standard, but had practically guaranteed 
that it would be the focal point of politics for the coming election year. 
II. ARGUMENT 
There is no single contemporary source from which we could glean a 
comprehensive picture of the argument over money in the 1890s. Indeed, because 
the focus of my inquiry is on the discursive field, any contemporary analysis of the 
money question is not only a description of the field, but also an element of the 
field itself. No source can be trusted for its own self-representation, which is 
always part of framing the field. Therefore, what follows is necessarily synthetic, 
and because it attempts analytical reconstruction, it will necessarily be partial. The 
reconstruction offered here opens with the most direct political discourse over 
gold and silver as standards and moves to economic treatment of the more 
abstract questions of the structure of the money supply and the relationship 
between money and credit. 
A. Politicking Silver and Gold, or, Of Direct Political Discourse 
The advantage in pursuing what I will call direct political discourse is that it 
affords (with blinding clarity, one might say) a view of the conflict as starkly 
 
11. See id. at 408; MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 18671960, at 10419 (1963). 
12. For a detailed and dramatic account of the syndicate, including the questionable legal basis 
for a private placement of government debt, see J.S. STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER 
34045 (1999). 
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contradictory. Sophistication and nuance of argument may blur battle lines but 
direct political discourse suffers no cloudiness. Indeed, it is difficult to read much 
of political literature of the time, whether in books, pamphlets, political speeches, 
newspapers, or journals devoted to politics (or more specifically to the politics of 
money), without a sense that the protagonists are talking past one another. The 
tone often appears geared more toward rallying the faithful than toward 
convincing the opposition. Occasionally, an editor might pull together 
contributions from a range of writers in an attempt at “a fair presentation of both 
sides of the questions at issue,” with the hope that “every reader who seeks to 
know what is the right solution of the problem that meets him, rather than the 
mere fortifying of himself in an opinion previously formed, [may find] here the 
material wherewith to form an opinion that he may defend, from full and careful 
study of all opposing views.”13 But as a general matter, publishers and editors had 
scant interest in impartiality: the politics of publication seemed no less touched by 
partisanship than the politics of money. The content of this discourse is repetitive, 
and the major arguments on each side tend to mirror each other in rough parallels. 
To recall, the position of silver advocates was that the United States should 
return to a policy of bimetallism, conducted by free minting of gold and silver 
with the dollar unit returning to its traditional valuation of 412½ grains of 
standard (or 371¼ grains pure) silver to the dollar, holding the ratio of sixteen to 
one vis-à-vis gold. Direct political discourse fixated on this salient focal point, 
discussing the reasons for moving to free coinage and the likely results thereof, 
rather than the question of the ratio itself (e.g. why not eighteen to one or twenty-
two or thirty to one).14 Though the argument included hundreds of participants 
and ranged over thousands of printed pages, five basic paired arguments recurred 
with overwhelming frequency and give the basic sense of how direct political 
debate proceeded. 
1. Tradition Versus Evolution 
The first argument pair is almost purely about the rhetorical association of 
the particular metals. Silver advocates repeated that silver was the money of 
tradition, the dollar of the founding fathers, everyday money for the common 
people; gold advocates claimed that gold was the evolutionary choice for advanced 
economies. No one assumed that the very mention of patriotism and the founders 
would do the work of convincing the critics of silver, and at times the mention of 
 
13. SILVER AND GOLD, OR, BOTH SIDES OF THE SHIELD 67 (Trumbull White ed., Phila., 
Publisher’s Union 1895). 
14. There were exceptions, especially before 1893, when discussion of free coinage at a ratio 
other than 16 to 1 was not uncommon. See, e.g., JAMES GILLESPIE BLAINE, BLAINE AGAINST FREE 
COINAGE AT 16-1: SPEECH OF HON. JAMES G. BLAINE, OF MAINE, IN THE SENATE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 7TH, 1878 (D.C., n. pub. 1896) (advocating, in 1878, free coinage at a 
higher ratio). 
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tradition seemed to be merely a gesture toward respectability.15 On the other hand, 
the rhetorical power of association with the founding fathers was strong enough 
for gold advocates to respond, either by challenging the relevance of tradition,16 or 
by trying to turn the tradition in their favor. Thus, gold advocates sometimes 
claimed that the true meaning of the adoption of silver and the silver-gold ratio by 
the founding fathers was that they were committed to market driven currency.17 
The patriotic appeal of silver also came through in claims that the gold standard 
was a plot by the British to reestablish control over its former colonies. Perhaps 
the most direct articulation of this charge came in the Democratic Party Platform 
of 1896:  
We are unalterably opposed to monometallism, which has locked fast the 
prosperity of an industrial people in the paralysis of hard times. Gold 
monometallism is a British policy, and its adoption has brought other 
nations into financial servitude to London. It is not only un-American, 
but anti-American, and it can be fastened on the United States only by 
the stifling of that spirit and love of liberty which proclaimed our political 
independence in 1776 and won it in the War of the Revolution.18 
Gold advocates argued by rhetorical association with no less flourish. For 
them, the positive association was with evolution, advancement, and civilization. 
The claim was that gold was the choice of commercial experience, being an 
evolutionary advance from a more primitive stage of civilization that relied on 
silver. Supporters of the gold standard regularly grouped the silver nations 
together as primitive, while holding up the example of Germany and England as 
models of advanced civilization. A substantial quotation offers the feel of 
prevalent rhetoric: 
For nearly twenty years every enlightened nation in the world has been 
on a gold-standard basis. They are all representative governments and 
 
15. See, e.g., PETER MARIE, OUGHT WE TO REMONETIZE SILVER? 2325 (n.p., n. pub. 1878). 
16. For the refutation that tradition should be a basis for policy, see JOSEPH WEEKS 
BABCOCK, THREE EVENINGS WITH SILVER AND MONEY: A TALK OF FOUR NEIGHBOURS ABOUT 
MONEY AND SILVER. FROM THE REMARKS OF JOS. W. BABCOCK OF WISCONSIN IN THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE 8, 1896, at 7 (D.C., n. pub. 1896); NELSON DINGLEY, THE TREASURY 
CONDITION—16 TO 1 FREE SILVER: SPEECH OF HON. NELSON DINDLEY, JR. OF MAINE IN THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 5, 1896, at 14 (D.C., n. pub. 1896); DAVID JAYNE HILL, A 
PRIMER OF FINANCE 29 (N.Y.C., The Nat’l Republican Exec. Comm. 1896); see also John R. Procter, 
The Dollar of the Fathers, 1 PRESENT PROBS., Oct. 1896. 
17. See, e.g., THEO C. KNAUFF, THE PEOPLE’S FRIEND?: AN ADDRESS DELIVERED AT 
MEADVILLE, PA, OCTOBER 20, 1896, OPPOSING THE RE-ELECTION OF HON. JOS. C. SIBLEY TO 
CONGRESS BY THEO C. KNAUFF, REPRESENTING THE SOUND MONEY LEAGUE OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 28 (n.p., n. pub. 1896); ROWLAND HAZARD, ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE 
TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL FAIR OF THE WASHINGTON COUNTY AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY, 
SEPTEMBER 16TH, 1896, at 16 (Wakefield, R.I., D. Gillies’ Sons, Times Print 1896). 
18. John T. Wolley & Gerhard Peters, Democratic Party Platform of 1896, THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29586 (last visited Feb. 
1, 2012). 
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their laws are made by their people and for their people. The government 
which first established the gold standard is more obedient to the will of 
its people than ours is. . . . The gold standard nations are those that have 
reclaimed the world from barbarians, and have given it all its learning and 
invention; where schools and churches abound; where the dignity of man 
is maintained and labor properly rewarded; and they control the 
commerce of the world. 
  These nations, after testing gold and silver for hundreds of years, 
voluntarily adopted the gold standard. No nation to-day has the silver 
standard from choice. It is only because they are weak and helpless to 
remedy the evil that any of them remain on a silver basis. But to-day the 
United States, the foremost nation in all the earth in solvency and 
resources, in intelligence and energy, is seriously invited to abandon the 
standard of civilization and commerce and to consort with half-civilized, 
half-clad people, who are weak and ignorant; who have little or no 
commerce; where bull-fights abound and schools do not; where human 
labor is in sharp competition with the meek and lowly jackass; where 
breech-clout is preferred to a full suit, and where the bulk of the people 
know no more about a standard of value than a mule does about the 
nebular hypothesis. Surely we would do well to look at the company 
before we sit down to the feast.19 
And when the mood shifted away from righteous anger and disdain for the 
opposition, gold rhetoric could stray to the Panglossian: 
We have the best standard of value which exists. We have built upon it 
our great financial and commercial system. If any section of our country 
believes it can change this standard and destroy this system without injury 
to itself it makes a terrible mistake. The mere threat of a change of 
standard has deprived tens of thousands of workers of their wages. This 
standard of value, this gold standard, has come down to us from our 
fathers. It is the outgrowth of experience. Nation after nation has 
adopted it, until all the great civilized nations are gold standard nations. 
They have done this because gold is better than silver for the purposes of 
standard money. To go back to silver would hinder the onward march of 
civilization.20 
 
19. DONELSON CAFFERY, ALDREDGE ON FREE COINAGE OF SILVER: FROM REMARKS OF 
HON. DONELSON CAFFERY OF LOUISIANA IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FRIDAY, 
JANUARY 30, 1896, at 3 (D.C., n. pub. 1896). Silver advocates were capable of similar rhetoric of 
association, even to the extent of racializing the metals, as William Harvey, famed author of Coin’s 
Financial School, stated: “We would place the white metal on an equal footing with the colored metal 
without regard to previous condition of race or servitude.” William Harvey & J. Laurence Laughlin, 
The Harvey-Laughlin Debate, in SILVER AND GOLD, OR, BOTH SIDES OF THE SHIELD, supra note 13, at 
33.  
20. HAZARD, supra note 17, at 16. Or elsewhere, in a similar vein: “Because it is the metal 
whose value has been found to be the most steady, gold is the only possible standard in a civilized 
country.” C. STUART PATTERSON, A CURRENCY CATECHISM 7 (Phila., Sound Money League of 
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2. More Money or Stronger? 
The most pragmatic aspect of direct political discourse over the standard was 
the question of whether more plentiful money, or money with stronger purchasing 
power, was in the best interests of the populace. One economic historian summed 
up popular feeling thus: “To the farmers and the workers whose incomes were 
falling either absolutely or relatively in these years it seemed self-evident that what 
was needed was more money.”21 I will return to this claim in more detail when 
examining economists’ arguments over the money supply, but for now a brief 
explanation should suffice. For moderns, the idea that “more money” (in the 
system, as opposed to in an individual’s pocket) would spell relief for victims of 
hard economic times is far from intuitive, and yet to the late nineteenth-century 
observer the argument was quite straightforward. The amount of money in 
circulation determines prices, and a decline of prices dampens the impulse to 
invest in productive enterprise and leads instead to hoarding. As Senator Stewart 
of Nevada put the point:  
The decline of prices has been so serious, as to induce prudent men to go 
short on property, by declining to engage in new enterprises, and by 
converting their property into money futures. Enforced idleness, 
produced by the enhancement of the value of gold, or what is the same 
thing, the fall of prices, has withdrawn the progressive and the ambitious 
from productive undertakings, and has led them to seek wealth by 
investment in money futures.22  
Senator Jones of Arkansas, who would eventually chair the Democratic 
National Committee and head Bryan’s campaign made a similar argument, 
emphasizing the idea that falling prices were the result of a lack of money brought 
on by the demonetization of silver. Decreasing the quantity of “redemption 
money” brings on a decline in prices, and the decline in prices results in capital 
resting idly in banks: “The large amounts of idle capital now in the banks means 
stagnation in business. Money cannot find profitable employment.”23 
 
Pennsylvania 1896). 
21. MYERS, supra note 4, at 199. She continues: “It is so clearly a matter of common sense that 
more money is good for the individual that it seems to follow as a matter of logic that more currency 
is good for the country.” Id. 
22. William M. Stewart, The Science of Money, in SILVER AND GOLD, OR, BOTH SIDES OF THE 
SHIELD, supra note 13, at 233. 
23. Senator Jones at Malvern: He Makes an Able Argument for the Free Coinage of Silver, THE COM. 
APPEAL (Memphis), June 30, 1895, at 1. Charles Crisp, who was Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, echoed these arguments in Speaker Crisp on Free Coinage, WEEKLY ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Apr. 2, 1896, at 1. Or another formulation: 
It is a fact that as there is not enough gold to perform all the functions of money or to 
transact the business of the country, we must have some money other than gold . . . . 
When we increase the forms of credit in our country, we enlarge our business possibilities, 
and we accomplish this by increasing the amount and uses of silver money.  
Morris Estee, By Morris M. Estee of California, in SILVER AND GOLD, OR, BOTH SIDES OF THE SHIELD, 
supra note 13, at 38485.  
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Gold advocates countered with the claim that strong money was in the best 
interests of the country, and perhaps most particularly in the interests of the 
farmers and laborers: “The best money is the money of greatest purchasing power, and that 
money has the maximum of purchasing power which is exchangeable at par, not 
only in the country from whose mint it is issued, but also in the markets of the 
world.”24 John Carlisle, Cleveland’s Treasury Secretary, was one of the most 
forceful advocates of this position. In a speech eventually published as delivered 
“Before the Workingmen of Chicago,” Carlisle expounded at length on the 
dangers of the movement for free coinage of silver. The premise of the speech 
was that free coinage would bring about commercial convulsion to the extent of 
revolution destroying most aspects of enterprise, but the more direct threat was 
that workers would suffer from depreciated currency:  
Steady employment and good pay in good money are essential to the 
comfort and happiness of the American laborer and his wife and 
children, and he will be unfaithful to himself and to them if he does not 
insist upon the adoption and maintenance of such a policy as will most 
certainly preserve the value and stability of all our currency.25  
Gold advocates apparently saw the purchasing power claim as a strong and 
persuasive argument, and it appears perhaps more often and more insistently than 
any other claim in what I have called direct political discourse.26 
3. The Causes and Meaning of Price Decline  
While a few outliers might be found, there was nearly universal agreement 
among contemporaries that declining prices were a central characteristic of the last 
third of the nineteenth century.27 Advocates of silver and gold were divided on 
 
24. C. Stuart Patterson, An Argument for the Gold Standard, 1 PRESENT PROBS., Aug. 1896, at 5.  
25. SEN. VILAS, SPEECH OF HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE BEFORE THE WORKINGMEN OF 
CHICAGO, S. DOC. NO. 256, at 4 (1st Sess. 1896). In a mode of argument especially attractive to 
politicians, Carlisle could go on to argue not only that silver coinage would depreciate the currency, 
but that it would also contract the currency because gold would be driven out beyond what silver 
could make up. Id. at 78. 
26. For just a few of the many instances, see HENRY L. BEACH, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE 
DISCUSSION OF THE FINANCIAL ISSUE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1896: ILLUSTRATED BY SELECTED 
CARTOONS 45 (n.p., n. pub. 1896); WILLIAM BOURKE COCKRAN, SPEECH OF HON. W BOURKE 
COCKRAN IN REPLY TO HON. W. J. BRYAN, DELIVERED AT MADISON SQUARE GARDEN, NEW 
YORK CITY, TUESDAY, AUGUST 18TH, 1896, at 9 (n.p., n. pub. 1896); JOHN S. HANSON, THE 
FARMER’S DOLLAR 4 (N.Y.C, n. pub. 1896); HILL, supra note 16, at 24; JOHN IRELAND, DANGER TO 
THE COUNTRY 67 (n.p., n. pub. 1896); J. EDWARD SIMMONS, THE FREE AND UNLIMITED 
COINAGE OF SILVER 12 (n.p., n. pub. 1896); JAMES THOMPSON MCCLEARY, MCCLEARY ON SILVER 
AND GOLD, WAGES AND PRICES: HISTORY, SCIENCE, AND COMMON SENSE ALL ARGUE FOR 
HONEST MONEY, EXTRACT FROM THE SPEECH OF HON. J. T. MCCLEARY OF MINNESOTA IN THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1896, at 13 (n.p., n. pub. 1896); H. 
WALLERSTEIN, PLAIN TALK FROM A PLAIN MAN 9 (n.p., n. pub. 1896); INFLUENCE OF FREE 
SILVER ON THE WAGES OF WORKING PEOPLE AND FIXED INCOMES 1011 (n.p., n. pub. 1896). 
27. That agreement is borne out by subsequent historical research. See supra text 
accompanying notes 59. For an outlier (but a slightly complex one), see Simon Newcomb, Has the 
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both the cause of the long term price decline and its evaluation. Silver advocates 
saw the decline of prices (especially farm prices) as a threat to the basic ability to 
earn a livelihood and as a root cause of rising unemployment. The intuitive appeal 
of this argument for agricultural producers apparently supplied much of the fuel 
for populist support of silver. For farmers, it was clear that price declines were a 
fundamental danger: their taxes and especially their debt payments were fixed in 
advance (in particular, mortgages), holding to nominal dollars; their incomes, on 
the other hand, plummeted with the crashing prices of wheat, cotton, and other 
agricultural staples. They attributed the price decline first and foremost to the 
monetary system, and in particular to the demonetization of silver in what they 
called “the crime of 1873.”28 
Gold advocates wrote about price declines as if dealing with a completely 
different phenomenon. In terms of causation, they denied the influence of 
demonetization and saw the decline in prices as driven by technological advances 
that affected the real economy: increased acreage of farmed land; better 
transportation (which both increased available acreage and allowed products to 
compete from greater distances); and especially increased productivity resulting 
from mechanization and industrialization.29 In evaluating the significance of price 
declines, gold advocates typically presented price declines from the perspective of 
consumers, rather than producers, arguing that as a result of the decline in prices, 
“people whose earnings are small can now enjoy comforts such as never before in 
 
Standard Gold Dollar Appreciated?, 1 J. POL. ECON. 503, 510 (1893) (“My conclusion is that the doctrine 
so widely and industriously disseminated, that our standard gold dollar has increased in value during 
the past twenty years, will not stand examination, when tested by any equitable standard, and that, as a 
matter of fact, it has rather depreciated.”). 
28. William “Coin” Harvey’s articulation of the conspiracy theory regarding the 
demonetization of silver was not the first, but was the most popular. WILLIAM HOPE HARVEY, 
COIN’S FINANCIAL SCHOOL 1517 (Chi., Coin Publ’g Co. 1894). Though Harvey was not the origin 
of the conspiracy theory, his popularity was enough to lead Richard Hofstadter to focus on Harvey 
when characterizing silver populists as emblematic of the paranoid style. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, 
THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS, AND OTHER ESSAYS (1996). For a more virulent 
strain of the conspiracy argument, see O.F. BURTON, CAMPAIGN EDUCATION, 1896 (n.p., n. pub. 
1896). Academic advocates of silver rejected (or ignored) the conspiracy theory, but held onto the 
idea that the decline in the monetary use of silver was the primary force in generating price declines 
throughout the gold economies. See infra text accompanying notes 5059. 
29. The decline in prices generally is not connected with the quantity of money. New 
sources of supply, better transportation, improved processes and appliances, the greater 
efficiency of better paid labor, have operated to reduce the cost of production. The 
severity of competition has reduced the margin of profit—therefore prices have fallen.  
Carman Fitz Randolph, The Free Coinage of Silver, 1 J. POL. ECON. 25 (1893).  
[N]ot a single commodity that has notably declined in price within this time can be named, 
in respect to which clear, abundant and specific evidence cannot be adduced in proof that 
this decline has been due to decreased cost of production or distribution, or to changes in 
supply and demand occasioned by wholly fortuitous circumstances.  
DAVID A. WELLS, BREAKERS AHEAD 6 (Jersey City, The Jersey City Printing Co. 1896). These ideas 
appeared often. See, e.g., DELMORE ELWELL, A WALL STREET VIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN ISSUES OF 
1896, at 1416 (n.p., n. pub. 1896); MCCLEARY, supra note 26, at 8.  
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the history of the world were within their reach.”30 Indeed, some antisilver tracts 
of the period discussed low prices as a mark of prosperity and abundance, in 
seeming disregard of economic conditions that most observers described as 
depressed.31 Gold advocates often claimed that while prices of most commodities 
had declined, wages had not, and therefore that wage earners were better off.32 
4. Leading World Bimetallism, or Powerless in the Face of Markets? 
While the previous argument dealt with silver and gold advocates’ historical 
sensibilities, the next phase of the argument advances to their speculations about 
the future. In political discourse, silver advocates always presented themselves as 
bimetallists. They claimed that adoption of a policy of free coinage by the United 
States would first raise prices and bring domestic prosperity, but also that it would 
act as a trigger and lead other countries struggling with the gold standard back to 
bimetallism. The idea was that if a major economic power like the United States 
actually committed to free coinage of silver, the market prices of gold and silver 
would inevitably move toward convergence at the ratio it established between 
them. Because existing dollar-denominated debts could then be discharged with 
silver, the value of silver would inch its way toward the previous value of gold; 
gold in turn would inch its way down toward the previous value of silver. Thus, 
silver advocates did anticipate that prices would rise, but not by as much as the 
current difference between the market price of gold and silver.33 But silver 
advocates believed that the United States would not actually be alone in 
(re)instituting bimetallism. They consistently claimed that European countries 
were wavering between gold and bimetallism, and that once the United States took 
leadership, continental Europe would follow.34 
At the level of political discourse, gold advocates ridiculed the idea that 
establishing free coinage could lead to a new equilibrium. They were absolutely 
adamant that the result of free coinage would be to drive gold out of circulation, 
 
30. A FREE COINAGE CATECHISM 9 (n.p., n. pub. 1896). 
31. GEORGE H. BAKER, GOOD AND BAD MONEY 8 (N.Y.C., n. pub. 1896); J. ANTHONY 
STARKE, THE TRUE SITUATION 4 (N.Y.C., C.B. Handy & Co. 1896). 
32. EDWARD ATKINSON, THE COST OF BAD MONEY 1617 (Phil., Sound Money League of 
Pennsylvania 1895); MCCLEARY, supra note 26, at 13; WHICH DO YOU WANT . . . FREE COINAGE OR 
SOUND MONEY? FACTS FOR WORKING PEOPLE 1 (n.p., n. pub. 1896); Edward Atkinson, The Battle 
of Standards and the Fall of Prices, 14 FORUM 143, Apr. 1895, 913.  
33. See T.E. POWELL, THE BIMETALLIC LEAGUE AND THE GOLD STANDARD DEFENCE 
ASSOCIATION (1896). Economists who did not favor bimetallism did appreciate that theoretically a 
convergence of values should result from establishment of a new ratio with free coinage. Thus, Irving 
Fisher in a paper expressing no less than “horror” at the proposal of introducing a ratio of 15½ to 1, 
nonetheless states that depreciation of the currency must be the result, “though not to the extent of 
the original difference of value,” and that with bimetallism “the metals reach a common level by 
mutual approach.” Irving Fisher, The Mechanics of Bimetallism, 4 ECON. J. 527, 536 & n.3 (1894). 
34. See W.S. WETMORE, WHY GOLD PRICES CONTINUE TO DECLINE (Shanghai, The 
Eastern Bimetallic League 1895). 
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scare away foreign capital, and bring all commerce to a gnashing halt. As already 
mentioned, gold advocates claimed that prices of necessities would double while 
wages stagnated, and though they claimed that prices would immediately rise, 
many also said that the actual effect of free coinage of silver would be a contraction 
of the currency because gold would either be exported or would flee into domestic 
hoards.35 Scaremongering aside, gold advocates made two claims about the likely 
results of free coinage that succeeded in shaping a great deal of the policy 
discussion. The first claim was that free coinage at the ratio of sixteen to one 
would drive all gold out of circulation, resulting in effect in silver monometallism, 
an outcome all considered undesirable. The second claim (discussed below in a 
slightly different form), was the direct lesson to be learned from the disappearance 
of gold: for gold advocates, this was simply evidence of the fact that government 
was always powerless to affect the iron law of supply and demand, and thus 
impotent to influence underlying economic reality in any significant way. As one 
writer summed up: “[I]n inflating prices we do not advance values, but leave them 
to be fixed by a law which Congress cannot alter—the law of supply and 
demand.”36 
5. Control by People Through Government, or Discipline Through International Markets? 
The most far reaching point of contention between silver and gold advocates 
was whether money could and ought to be controlled by government, or instead 
whether money was actually a channel to discipline government through 
international markets. For silverites, the focus on the moment of demonetization 
is a crucial element in their understanding of government control of money. 
Attention to a seemingly innocuous detail of coinage legislation that took the 
silver dollar off the list of standard coins was a signal that government could 
change the direction of economic development in a simple stroke. Thus, the true 
significance of the fixation on the so-called “crime of ‘73” lies not in the impetus 
to hunt for someone to blame, but rather in its demonstration that government 
action determined the form of money, and that money in turn shaped the 
economic scene more generally. Legislation, even seemingly technical and arcane 
legislation, was always the key ingredient in any formulation of what was going on 
with money. 
Some observers could appreciate the issue as one of money creation proper: 
“The question is, who is to create the money with which that banking business is to 
 
35. FRANK MERRIMAN, GOLD AND SILVER; OR, SOME OF THE ALLEGED EFFECTS OF A 
LEGAL RATIO (London, Simpkin, Marshall, & Co. 1896); ISAAC ROBERTS, WAGES, FIXED INCOMES 
AND THE FREE COINAGE OF SILVER: OR, THE DANGER INVOLVED IN THE FREE COINAGE OF 
SILVER AT THE RATIO OF 16 TO 1, ETC. (Phila., John Highlands 1896); WALLERSTEIN, supra note 26; 
Randolph, supra note 29. 
36. Randolph, supra note 29, at 26. 
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be carried on—the banks or the people, acting through their government?”37 Ignatius 
Donnelly’s full discussion of the point is marvelously acute. In the framework of a 
fictional discussion between a gentleman farmer (Mr. Sanders) and a banker (Mr. 
Hutchenson), Donnelly compares money to postage stamps as notes representing 
the faith and credit of the nation, and explains how paper money retains 
acceptability through its ability to discharge tax obligations: 
[Farmer, Mr. Sanders:] “You never stop to ask the intrinsic value of the 
postage stamp. You know that it will carry your letter from Maine to 
Alaska—half around the globe. And what do you care about the intrinsic 
value of the $5 greenback? You know you can swap it for 500 one cent 
postage stamps, or you can take it to the custom house and pay $5 of 
duties on goods imported from abroad; or you can pay $5 of internal 
revenue taxes with it; or $5 of your income tax, and you know that your 
neighbor or your creditor will take it, not only because it is legal tender, 
but because he too can pay duties or taxes or purchase postage stamps or 
pay debts with it. It represents the consensus of resolve of 70,000,000 
people.”38 
He then goes on to compare government money of this sort with bank 
money, as his farmer Mr. Sanders declares: 
“Your people [bankers] propose to take the faith and credit of the United 
States, which we chopped up into little non-interest bearing obligations 
of $5 or $10 each, and put it forth in the shape of larger notes, for $1,000 
or $10,000 each, called “bonds,” bearing interest, and you [bankers] will 
furnish us with the chopped chicken-feed we call money, and take your 
pay in the interest on the bonds. Now we think the nation can cut up its 
credit into small bills, without cost, just as well as a few individuals called 
bankers can do it at large cost to the people, whose credit and legal-
tender power is at the back of the transaction in either case.” 
“But,” said Mr. Hutchinson, “the government is not fitted to go into 
the banking business.” 
“Just as much,” said Mr. Sanders, “as the bankers are fitted to go 
into the governing business.”39 
For the more self-conscious populists among silver advocates, the primacy 
of government in the money system was a relatively plain fact, but one hidden 
from the populace through mystification. The attempt to break through that 
mystification explains the silverite penchant for political fictions in the style of 
 
37. IGNATIUS DONNELLY, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE’S MONEY 74 (Hyperion 1976) (1896) 
(emphasis added). 
38. Id. at 72. 
39. Id. at 73. Donnelly had a rich career as editor, essayist, political novelist, and politician. He 
was a greenbacker in the 1870s, and his silver advocacy in the 1890s was, as seen in the quoted 
passages, still inflected with a greenback position in principle. 
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Harvey’s Coin’s Financial School or Donnelly’s The American People’s Money.40 
Gold advocates, in contrast, portrayed government as having a secondary 
role in a properly conceived money system, but a dangerous potential to upset 
proper conceptions. For them, government could not actually shape the monetary 
system, which had its basis in trade; it could, however, intervene and deform the 
system in the short term, leading to general disaster. In its most direct versions, 
this was an unveiled critique of government power generally: 
Government is the organized instrument of a people in their political 
capacity only, and for the accomplishment of political purposes. Trade is 
not a political act or matter. . . . Every relation of trade, of need and 
supply, of production and consumption, of possession and want, as well 
as every incident of the complex machinery whereby each most 
effectively answers the call or meets the offer of the other, is purely 
personal, individual, and non-political. . . .  
 . . . . 
. . . [T]he government, not being in trade . . . has no natural relation to the 
creation of a credit currency, except to provide proper and effective legal 
remedies to safeguard it, and is not the proper party to issue it. Such an 
act is wholly foreign to its political functions of which commercial 
operations are no part in theory or fact. . . . 
  Manifestly, a government cannot be an issuer of a legitimate and 
permanent credit currency. It can, by coinage, certify the quantity and 
quality of the money metals brought to it for that purpose by its citizens, 
and provide the proper remedies and machinery for the enforcement of 
the many commercial contracts made by them. These are its proper 
political acts respecting the commerce and business of its citizens. But it 
has no other natural or permanent relations with trade.41 
 
40. DONNELLY, supra note 37; HARVEY, supra note 19. Political tracts in fictional form are an 
entertaining and edifying segment of the period’s political discourse, and they deserve separate 
treatment. Such works often open with a justification for pursuing education in the form of fiction. A 
rich example is reproduced here: 
Although money is almost as familiarly associated with our every-day life as the air we 
breathe and the water we drink, the laws which create and control it are considered as 
mysterious and incomprehensible as those which govern the universe of worlds in their 
eternal round through the immensity of space. Not only is the subject considered too 
profound for the common mind to understand, but the high priests of the Money Power 
have proclaimed it a political sacrilege to even contemplate the subject. There has ever 
been a persistent effort to complicate and mistify [sic] the financial question . . . . And all 
this has been done with the deliberate purpose of misleading the masses . . . . It has been 
done principally by the supporters of centralized governments in order that the aristocracy, 
the nobles and princes, might to greater advantage use the power of money to rob and 
enslave the people . . . . For the purpose, therefore, of simplifying and analyzing the 
subject, the writer has chosen the narrative style of presenting it.  
S.F. NORTON, TEN MEN OF MONEY ISLAND, OR THE PRIMER OF FINANCE 78 (Chi., Schulte 
Publ’g Co. 1892). 
41. Jacob L. Greene, A Proper Paper Currency: What It Is, and Who Can Utter It, SOUND 
CURRENCY, Nov. 1897, at 13. For a less polemical account with the same underlying message, see 
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Often, however, the focus for gold advocates was less on the legitimacy of 
government power per se, and more on the way international markets 
circumscribed the possibilities for wielding government power; in other words, 
gold advocates saw international markets as stringent disciplining devices that 
could not be circumvented except in the very short term and at great cost. For 
some this was a defensive explanation of why the United States could not institute 
bimetallism alone;42 for others it was a seemingly comforting acknowledgment 
that commerce, rather than politics, served as the directing force for economic 
conditions.43 
6. Direct Political Discourse—Closing Reflections 
In reflecting more generally on the arguments and discursive style of direct 
political discourse over the money question, three issues deserve mention: first, 
the type of partisanship that characterizes the discourse; second, the assumptions 
about politics; and third, the historiography of evaluation of the conflict. I take 
these up briefly in turn. 
The wide range of sources in which direct political discourse appeared in the 
late nineteenth century makes it dangerous to generalize about its character. And 
yet, there is something noteworthy about the style of partisanship typical of the 
discourse of money. I said at the outset that speakers often seem to be rallying the 
faithful rather than trying to convince opponents. However, rallying the faithful 
was not based, for the most part, on identifying with a particular group within the 
populace, unless one is ready to characterize “the people” as a group. The 
discourse of money was thoroughly a partisan discourse in the sense that the other 
side’s arguments were assumed to be and treated (and possibly even ridiculed) as 
completely wrong, and in some sense unworthy. But one’s arguments could not be 
presented as if they benefitted one’s own group exclusively; indeed, it was a 
common tactic to show that the other side’s arguments, while presented as 
generally beneficial, actually favored only one small group, typically bankers or 
mine owners.44 Thus, even the most direct political discourse was almost never 
phrased directly as interest group advocacy; political argument, no matter how 
 
generally Credit Currency, J. COMMERCE & COM. BULL. (1896), a series of editorial articles. 
42. For examples of Republican political support for bimetallism along these lines, see 
SHELBY MOORE CULLOM, CULLOM ON SOUND MONEY, HONEST COINAGE: SPEECH OF HON. 
SHELBY M. CULLOM OF ILLINOIS IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D.C., 
JUNE 1, 1896, at 12 (n.p., n. pub. 1896); DINGLEY, supra note 16, at 11. 
43. CAFFERY, supra note 19; Atkinson, supra note 32.  
44. See, e.g., JOSEPH WEEKS BABCOCK, BABCOCK ON MONEY: HISTORY OF MONEY AND 
FINANCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES: SPEECH OF HON. J. W. BABCOCK OF 
WISCONSIN IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 22, 1896, at 14 (D.C., n. pub. 1896); 
ARCHIBALD WILLINGHAM BUTT, WHERE SILVER RULES 4 (n.p., n. pub. 1896); CAFFERY, supra note 
19, at 7; BRYAN’S SPEECH: THE ORATION THAT WON HIS NOMINATION 21, 29 (Allen Ripley Foote 
ed., American Exporter 1896). 
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vituperative and one-sided, was always in some sense universalizing.45 
A second reflection touches on the shared assumptions of participants in 
direct political discourse on the money question. For the most part, the style of 
argument canvassed here assumes that the political arena itself is the realm of 
responsibility for public welfare. Politics, for the participants in the money 
controversy, is not primarily about recognition or identity: it is about the way 
government impacts the most general arrangements through which people meet 
their needs. It is, in other words, about what some would characterize as the social, 
in contradistinction to a purified realm of the political.46 The argument is over 
what kinds of governmental action will have beneficial effects, and over the extent 
to which government can lead. But whatever the position on the concrete 
question, the assumption is that politics is the place for a collective decision on the 
matter, and legislation is the result. Some participants in the debate hoped to 
remove money from the political discussion, but within political discourse this was 
completely against the grain. 
The final reflection highlights the existing historical evaluations of direct 
political discourse. There has often been a sense in the historical treatment of the 
silver advocates that they may have had a defensible moral position, but no 
analytical case; in other words, their hearts were in the right place, but their heads 
were not.47 It suggests that populist goals like easing the plight of the debt-
 
45. The maneuvering around partisanship was almost ever present in this discourse, taking 
many forms. For example, Adolph Ochs, upon taking over the New York Times in August of 1896, 
could proclaim that there would be no changes to the policies “that have distinguished the New York 
Times as a non-partisan newspaper—unless it be, if possible, to intensify its devotion to the cause of 
sound money and tariff reform . . . .” Adolph S. Ochs, Business Announcement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 
1896, at 1. The idea of nonpartisanship seemed, for Ochs, to sit comfortably with intense devotion to 
a particular position on the money question, and any doubts about that devotion could be dispelled 
by the news coverage of New York democrats’ alternative convention distancing themselves from 
Bryan and free silver. Thousands Hear W. Bourke Cockran, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1896, at 1. Political 
speeches themselves were full of posturing on the question of partisanship. For example: 
In the present emergency, in our country’s dire distress, I hold that any one who favors the 
unlimited free coinage of silver is a traitor to the country’s best interests. And I lay down 
the general proposition that no one who favors such free coinage is fit to be trusted with 
the country’s welfare as a representative of the people in its legislative halls. . . . 
. . . [I]n the present condition of this nation, no man who believes in the unlimited free 
coinage of silver by ourselves alone, and I make the additional statement, or any one who 
is willing to abide by and support the infamous platform adopted at Chicago, is fit to sit in 
the highest legislative body of this great country. Such a man is no friend of the people. 
Such a man is opposed to the operation of all natural law. . . . Such a man is willing, for the 
benefit of a few interested conspirators with private ends to further, to jeopardize all that 
has been accumulated by years of thrift, foresight, energy, brains and business ability. Such 
a man is blind to his own interests. 
KNAUFF, supra note 17, at 4. As we will see, the type of posturing over partisanship in economic 
discourse is related, but quite different at least in tone. 
46. This was not an Arendtian politics, though it was, to my mind, an experience of self-
government. On a concept of the political as necessarily above and apart from welfare and the social, 
see generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (2d ed. 1998). 
47. HOFSTADTER, supra note 28, at 286.  
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strapped farmers or spurring the economy so as to decrease unemployment might 
be laudable, but that the fixation on the money question was somehow irrational, 
backward looking, or based in passion rather than reason. Such an outlook betrays 
a subtle unwitting identification between its own evaluation and that of 
progressive elite opinion. In other words, such an historical outlook actually 
establishes the views of progressive elites of the succeeding generation as truth. 
Progressive historians made the populist critique seem like a backward looking 
brake on progress, hopelessly idyllic at best and insidiously traditional (read, racist) 
at worst. While those strands may exist, recent scholarship raises doubts about 
those interpretations, and the account here seems to reinforce the doubts.48 
B. From Politics to Political Economy to Economics 
Academic economists in the United States were coming into their own at the 
end of the nineteenth century. The first generation of academics trained by 
professional economists (usually in Germany) entered the universities in the 
1870s, and by the 1890s they were vying for leadership. They were beginning to 
establish a measure of cultural authority (as well as narrower but more direct 
authority within the universities), and the key avenue to that authority was the 
status of science. Economics had to be above partisan politics if it was to be 
authoritative, and only thus, paradoxically, fit to enter again into policy-making 
discourse, this time from above the fray. Dorothy Ross describes this “educated 
gentry” developing their authoritative voice through professionalized expertise: 
“In contrast to the politicians, labor leaders, and businessmen who raised divisive 
claims, the gentry could call on the authority of modern science to command 
agreement. Science allowed them to speak with the voice of universal rationality, 
while bestowing special authority on its elite class of practitioners.”49 
Thus, we should expect to see economic discourse conducted at some 
remove from the gloves-off quality that characterized direct political discourse. 
However, economists were anything but shy when expressing themselves, 
scientifically, about hot-button political issues: they all had clear positions on the 
issue of the monetary standard. The pages of academic publications, like The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, established at Harvard in 1886, and The Journal of 
Political Economy, established at the University of Chicago in 1892, are filled with 
articles and book reviews on the money question, many of them with themes quite 
 
48. For some recent interpretations, see T.J. JACKSON LEARS, REBIRTH OF A NATION: THE 
MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA, 18771920 (2009); MICHAEL E. MCGERR, THE DECLINE OF 
POPULAR POLITICS: THE AMERICAN NORTH, 18651928 (1986); CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST 
VISION (2007). 
49. DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 6162 (1991). Ross is 
referring to the uses of science by academic practitioners as well as business leaders or “new 
capitalists” who adopted scientific knowledge. See also MARY O. FURNER, ADVOCACY AND 
OBJECTIVITY: A CRISIS IN THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 
18651905, at 4849 (1975). 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
994 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:3 
 
close to those of contemporary political discourse. I have no intention, of course, 
of surveying the totality of that literature. Instead, I will try to show how 
economic discourse positioned itself vis-à-vis political discourse, asking in 
particular how varying levels of abstraction and sophistication pushed economic 
discourse down particular political paths. The story of that positioning begins with 
a discussion of the money supply and the price level, it continues with an account 
of the role of banks in supplying money, and it concludes with an examination of 
the credit relationship. 
1. Money Supply and Prices: The Vicissitudes of Quantity Theory 
Economists, like their counterparts in popular political discourse, were more 
or less obsessed with the fluctuation of prices, and in particular with the secular 
price decline from the 1870s through the 1890s. Professional economic discourse 
had significant overlap with direct political discourse regarding declining prices, 
but it also had distinctive elements unlikely to appear outside of economics. So, 
for example, economic and political discourses crossed paths directly regarding the 
causes of declining prices (i.e., demonetization of silver or technologically driven 
advances in productivity), but economic discourse raised the level of abstraction: 
the big question for the economists was whether the price level was driven by the 
money supply or by real economic fundamentals. Or in modern parlance, it asked 
whether deflation (or inflation) is a monetary phenomenon. Raising the level of 
abstraction also allowed economists to treat a wider range of phenomena in a 
unified framework. Thus, economic discourse was able to make explicit the 
linkages between questions of the monetary standard, international trade, tariffs, 
and the institutional structure (banking and the role of the Treasury). 
Benjamin Andrews’s An Honest Dollar is an ideal window through which to 
view these features of economic discourse. Originally published in 1894 and 
reissued in 1896 with a new opening chapter on “The Fall of Prices,” Andrews’s 
book weaves together domestic and international questions through a single 
theme: the monetary source of falling prices, falling output, and finally, depression 
and unemployment: 
A fall in general prices places a fatal clog, handicap or brake upon the 
creation of wealth. Making all due allowance for subsidiary difficulties, 
the radical business trouble from which this and other countries on the 
gold standard are now suffering is that, owing to the increasing scarcity of 
full money, goods of nearly all sorts are incessantly having to be sold at 
smaller and smaller prices. The blight upon our business originates in the 
scarcity of full or exportable money, leading to a continuous and 
discouraging fall in general prices, which first made production and credit 
business less and less profitable, and now at last makes them less and less 
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possible.50 
From this basic statement that the cause of business decline lay in the 
scarcity of money, Andrews would expand the frame, showing the intimate 
connection among the three seemingly disparate phenomena: of the scarcity of 
money, rising trade barriers from the United States (McKinley Tariff) all the way 
to New South Wales, and the rise of trusts: “We see in the fall of prices and the 
accompanying danger to business the true cause of the world-wide movement, so 
confounding to free-traders, for trusts and for what we should once have called 
inordinate protective tariffs.”51 The dangers to business, its “extra-hazardous” 
condition, lead supporters of business to seek shelter, whether through 
consolidation, tariff legislation, or both. Thus, the prospects for tariff reform were 
actually directly tied to monetary reform: “A low tariff policy can never be 
established in these United States so long as gold alone continues the basis of our 
currency.” Andrews explained this linkage in terms of trade, discussing at length 
the advantage held by exporters in countries on the silver standard: “Willingness 
to subject your country’s industries to normal foreign competition is one thing; 
quite another is it to do so when your competitors are helped to beat you by a 
home bonus on exportation, as is the case with nearly all exporters from silver and 
paper lands today.”52 Andrews also touched on the way an appreciating dollar 
affects the national debt, with the double effect of heavily burdening tax payers on 
the one hand, and exacerbating the spiral of gold scarcity on the other.53 
 
50. ELISHA BENJAMIN ANDREWS, AN HONEST DOLLAR WITH A CHAPTER ON “THE FALL 
OF PRICES” vii (Hartford, Student Publ’g Co., 3d. ed. 1896).  
51. Id. at xix. 
52. Id. at xixxx. For additional detail see id. at 91109. The detailed argument is based on an 
explanation of the confusion often made between falling prices and falling costs, and Andrews 
compares the periods between 1848 and 1873, when costs were declining but prices rising, and 
between 1873 and 1894, when costs were still declining but prices were declining due to the monetary 
situation. 
[C]osts were falling between 1848 and 1873—falling as rapidly as since 1873. But prices 
then were rising rather than falling and it was a period of extraordinary prosperity 
everywhere. . . . Falling costs imply prosperity. The signs of a régime of falling costs are high 
interest and dividends, good wages and profits, happy merchants, manufacturers, bankers, 
and workmen; few failures, few strikes and lockouts, rapidly multiplying industrial 
undertakings, and rapidly increasing wealth. This is not a picture of the world’s economic 
life for the last twenty years. Costs have fallen, doubtless, but the fall in prices has not 
consisted solely or mainly in reduced costs. 
Id. at 94. Or elsewhere, a different formulation on much the same point: “Doubtless the cost of 
producing most goods has declined since 1873, but there is no evidence that it has since then lowered 
a whit more rapidly than between 1850 and 1870, when prices were rising instead of falling.” Id. at 46. 
53. Id. at 8. This claim regarding the enlargement of the debt as it was nominally paid off was 
present in polemical form in direct political discourse as well: 
[I]t is the truth of the living God that in the year 1895 at its close, the national debt of the 
United States . . . will purchase as its equivalent in value as much of the average of twenty-
five of the leading commodities of the American market, including real estate and labor, as 
the same debt would purchase at its maximum on the 1st day of March, 1866! The people 
have paid and paid for thirty years, and at the end have paid just this—NOTHING! 
JOHN CLARK RIDPATH, THE BOND AND THE DOLLAR 6 (Boston, Arena Publ’g Co. 1896). 
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The primary focus of the book, as its title suggests, is the dollar. But at the 
same time, Andrews constantly has one eye on global integration:  
No two nations on earth are in effect so far apart to-day as were New 
Hampshire and Georgia when our Union was formed. . . . [T]he same 
force which shakes so many different nations into one, and consolidates 
so many individual nations, is compelling greater intimacy on the part of 
states which still remain governmentally separate.54  
And for Andrews, the ultimate lesson is clear. The problem of money is 
finding a way to ensure its stability in terms of purchasing power. Any monetary 
unit with fluctuating value will have deleterious effects, and appreciating money 
will prove especially destructive. Ideal money would track purchasing power 
exactly, but the difficulty in engineering such a tracking mechanism is great 
enough to recommend compromise solutions. A currency based on precious 
metals is such a compromise, and using two metals rather than one in the 
framework of international cooperation has the greatest prospects for achieving 
relative parity between money units and purchasing power. Finally, Andrews is 
most adamant that monetary arrangements are the products of human hands, the 
responsibility of government: 
The condensation of population upon our globe introduces a new 
necessity for conscious action by men in the direction of their greatest 
affairs. As civilization advances, the Power above takes man more and 
more into his counsel in shaping it. Idle trust in the so-called natural laws 
of social growth was once not so unsafe; but now the crowding and 
jostling occasioned by the density of society demand all possible 
thoughtfulness on men’s part. Grave problems arise that once had no 
existence. They will not down, nor will they solve themselves.55 
Andrews was not alone, either in his support for bimetallism, or in his more 
general analysis of the interaction between prices, economic activity, and the 
monetary standard. Indeed, major elements of his analysis of the money 
controversy appear in remarkably similar form in Francis Amasa Walker’s 
International Bimetallism, published in 1896.56 Walker was a pillar of the economics 
community: he was president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and 
had been the inaugural president of the American Economic Association, as well 
as the author of what was considered by many the authoritative text on money, 
published nearly two decades earlier.57 Walker’s tone consistently searches out 
 
54. ANDREWS, supra note 50, at 54. 
55. Id. at 55. 
56. For example, see Walker’s analysis of falling costs with rising prices leading up to 1873, as 
compared to falling prices afterwards in FRANCIS A. WALKER, INTERNATIONAL BIMETALLISM 
26465 (N.Y.C., Henry Holt & Co. 1896). 
57. FRANCIS A. WALKER, MONEY (N.Y.C., Henry Holt & Co. 1878). On Walker’s biography, 
see 3 JOSEPH DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 10110 (1946); ROSS, 
supra note 49, at 7985. 
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balance, but his conclusions are perfectly in accord with Andrews’s, and the better 
part of his concluding chapter is devoted to showing that “the chief of the evil 
effects produced by a diminishing money supply is . . . the impairment of 
enterprise on the part of the producer and the exchanger of wealth, due to falling 
prices.”58 And if Walker’s tone was balanced or conciliatory, younger economists 
like J. Allen Smith took up similar positions in a more combative style: “The 
solution of the money question clearly lies in the direction of a broadening of the 
monetary basis. The circulating medium must be relieved of its absolute 
dependence on a single commodity. The movement of the civilized world toward 
gold monometallism is a backward and not a forward step.”59 
Opposition to the free coinage of silver more generally from within 
professional economics typically took one of two tacks. The first option was a 
claim that price declines, if they occurred at all, were the result of increased 
productivity rather than monetary factors; in other words, it was an assault on the 
quantity theory of money. The second mode of opposition was a shift in emphasis 
from the specie (gold and silver) basis of the money supply to other modes of 
introducing monetary elasticity—including credit. Each of these deserves some 
elaboration. 
In books, pamphlets, and a barrage of articles in the (then) recently 
established Journal of Political Economy, a number of economists, some quite 
prominent, took aim at the quantity theory of money. Their critiques ranged in 
methodology and style, with some undertaking detailed empirical examination of 
prices and others developing theoretical and even philosophical bases for the 
assault. Sometimes the critique of quantity theory was incidental to other 
concerns, and in particular the discussion of price stability and its relation to 
monetary standards; at other times, quantity theory itself was the central focus of a 
work. A number of common themes animate the critiques. 
The first task taken up in common by the critiques is to assess quantity 
theory as a method for answering the question of why prices had declined. The 
critics, therefore, focus at various levels on the determinants of prices. At the level 
of economic theory, they denied that the money supply could drive the price level 
and they offered an alternative determining factor: the declining cost of 
production. Simply put, the argument was that the cost of production of almost all 
commodities had decreased, and that this reduction in the costs of production was 
the result of increased productivity brought on by mechanization and improved 
transportation. This shift of focus—from the question of the general price level, 
to the question of the determination of individual prices—was a delicate, yet 
crucial maneuver. At times the strategy for affecting this maneuver was to point to 
 
58. WALKER, supra note 56, at 273. 
59. J. Allen Smith, The Multiple Money Standard, 7 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 173, 
181 (1896). 
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the host of different products, with their varying fluctuations in price that included 
some products whose prices had actually risen. In other words, critics of quantity 
theory often hinted that there was no sense in speaking generally of the price level, 
or of a general decline in prices. A related strategy was to shift the theoretical 
ground, claiming that a scientific theory of prices need only focus on the price of 
an individual article, since the explanation of the determinants or elements of price 
was generalizable to all products.60 
Another mode of critique of the quantity theory of money rested less on its 
theoretical bases, and more on an empirical examination of the history of prices 
vis-à-vis the circulation of currency. Several empirical examinations of this sort 
were conducted, and the results most promising for critics of quantity theory came 
from the Civil War period: during the war, it was argued, prices rose not in 
response to the level of currency introduced into the economy, but rather in 
response to people’s expectations regarding the chances of Union victory in the 
war. Good news for the Union appreciated its paper currency; bad news led to 
inflation. The view expressed here was that people’s expectations determined the 
value of money: when they were hopeful of Union victory, and thus of 
redemption of Union notes, they accorded them a higher value, when despondent, 
a lower value. In other words, it is the independently decided determinations of 
exchange value by individuals that creates a price level.61 
The third common argument against quantity theory was that it ignored, or 
at least could not account for, the importance of credit and the relative 
insignificance of cash. Quantity critics were fond of noting that large proportions 
of commerce—reaching perhaps above ninety percent—were conducted on some 
credit basis, rather than involving direct payment in standard money. The 
estimations of how much business was handled without money fluctuated wildly, 
in part because there was no accepted meaning of credit, with some estimates 
including business carried on by check, and others limited to credit involving time 
instruments such as promissory notes or book credits. The underlying point, 
however, was that the amount of coin in the system was but one detail in 
determining the price level, and a relatively insignificant one when viewed in light 
of the nature of prices.62 
 
60. JACOB SCHOENHOF, MONEY AND PRICES: AN INQUIRY INTO THEIR RELATIONS FROM 
THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT TIME 318 (N.Y.C., Knickerbocker Press 1896); F. 
U. Laycock, Honest Money, 3 J. POL. ECON. 472 (1895); H. Parker Willis, The History and Present 
Application of the Quantity Theory, 4 J. POL. ECON. 417 (1896). 
61. S. McLean Hardy, The Quantity of Money and Prices, 18601891, 3 J. POL. ECON. 145, 
14547 (1895); Wesley C. Mitchell, The Quantity Theory of the Value of Money, 4 J. POL. ECON. 139, 
14445 (1896). 
62. Robert F. Hoxie, The Silver Debate of 1890, 1 J. POL. ECON. 535, 55658 (1893). A typical 
articulation might be: 
The immense credit deposit accounts in the banks and the very general use of checks and 
notes and of silver make it clear that gold is but one element of price. . . . Where the 
banking system is highly developed a small quantity of coin suffices . . . . In our own 
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The various critiques of quantity theory have a common thread, which is the 
idea that money is merely a veil over true economic activity, which is purely 
exchange: “Under a system of exchange, where money alone is used, the rates at 
which things will exchange one for another, or, in everyday language, their prices 
will be no different from what they would be if all transfers were solely effected by 
barter.”63 The claim then is that nothing fundamental would be achieved by a 
change in the money supply: a short-term shock to the system might occur, but it 
could have no lasting effects on the underlying economic conditions. This 
position reached its zenith in claims that government was simply powerless to 
change anything about money, or at least powerless to do so without upsetting the 
very foundations of the political system:  
It is difficult to conceive any way in which the standard of deferred 
payment could be fixed by law without so restricting the freedom of 
contract as seriously to inhibit business transactions, or without 
subjecting each business contract calling for payment in the future to the 
fickle influence of political changes. However exalted an opinion one may 
hold of the power of Congress, or of any other legislative body, a 
moment’s reflection must make it clear that the power of government to 
“do what it likes” in monetary matters, is not unlimited. . . . Legislation 
follows, as it always must, if it is to be effective, the course of public 
opinion. . . . Governments, then, one may safely say, not only do not, 
they cannot determine the standard of deferred payment.64 
And of course, these claims were mirrored precisely in the opposing claims 
of silver advocates.65 
 
country, gold has been largely supplanted by the use of various forms of what may be 
called representative money. This is a matter of business convenience. To connect the fall 
in prices which characterizes the closing decades of the century with the small amount of 
gold entering into exchanges in any relation of cause and effect is a complete non sequitur. 
John Cummings, Monetary Standards, 2 J. POL. ECON. 349, 366 (1894). For critique of the view that 
credit overwhelmed cash completely, see Willard Fisher, Money and Credit Paper in the Modern Market, 3 
J. POL. ECON. 391 (1895); Willard Fisher, Book Review, 4 J. POL. ECON. 248 (1896) (reviewing J. 
SCHLOENHOF, A HISTORY OF MONEY AND PRICES). 
63. WILLIS, supra note 60, at 431. Willis includes a footnote quoting Mill’s Principles of Political 
Economy: “The relations of commodities to one another remain unaltered by money; the only new 
relation introduced is their relation to money itself.” Id. at 431 n.1. 
64. Cummings, supra note 62, 35152. 
65. In every nation, arising from the mere fact of its organized existence, there is an 
universal and persistent need to employ something not merely as a medium of exchange, 
but as the legal instrument of valuation and legal means of payment, as lawful money and 
legal tender. It is legislation which directs this universal and persistent force upon this or 
upon that commodity . . . . It thus affects the demand for the commodity selected . . . . In 
modern days this initiative and control is peculiarly the province of the State . . . . The great 
modern movements in extension of what we call the “credit system” are an indefinite 
expansion of these very obligations over which, by fixing means of their fulfillment, the 
legislature and the court inevitably hold jurisdiction. 
SAMUEL DANA HORTON, THE POSITION OF LAW IN THE DOCTRINE OF MONEY 1920 (London, 
Chiswick Press 1882). 
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2. From Quantity Theory to Bank Paper 
Horace White’s Money and Banking is a bridge between the two tacks of 
opposition. He begins by subjecting a particular articulation of the quantity theory, 
in this case that of Francis A. Walker, to a semantic analysis. He posits that the 
theory holds that “prices are determined by four factors, three of which are 
indeterminable.” Of such a theory he concludes: “A proposition more barren and 
inconsequential it would be hard to imagine.”66 But White does not stop there, 
and instead tries to refute the accepted understanding of the theory according to 
which prices depend upon the amount of money in circulation. He undertakes a 
two-part demonstration: first, for the period from the Civil War to the 1890s, he 
relies on statistics according to which the money supply had grown while prices 
declined, making his refutation of the theory quite straightforward; then, regarding 
the period from 1834 to 1859, he is willing to admit (for the sake of argument) 
that prices and the quantity of currency moved together, but he argues that 
nothing flows from the concurrence: 
The same figures might equally prove that the quantity of currency in 
circulation depends on prices, which I think more likely. Here is a 
coincidence indeed, but nothing that proves a causal influence on one 
side more than on the other. Both the rise of prices and the increase of 
currency may be produced by a third cause, as for example a sanguine 
state of mind on the part of the trading community, gradually extending 
to all classes, and producing a general eagerness to buy things with the 
expectation of selling them at a higher price.67 
Thus White, like other economists, is arguing that prices are not determined 
by the volume of currency; instead, he says, it is the level of economic activity—
the expectations and actions of individuals—that generate changes in the money 
supply. If so, there is no reason to try to augment the money supply as a means of 
influencing prices. Individual decisions generate results; policy instruments are 
futile. But White goes further in this mode of analysis, writing as he does from a 
banking perspective: the proper management of the money supply should be in 
the hands of banks, because banks naturally and automatically respond to the 
demands of legitimate business. Thus, he supports a monetary system in which 
banks could issue notes without buying government securities, allowing the money 
supply to rise and fall with commercial demand.68 
 
66. HORACE WHITE, MONEY AND BANKING, ILLUSTRATED BY AMERICAN HISTORY 422 
(Bos., Ginn & Co. 1896). 
67. Id. at 425. 
68. The banker, if he understands his trade, enables the most deserving persons in the 
community to get possession of the tools and materials of industry without the use of 
money. The most deserving persons, in the commercial sense, are those who can make the 
most profitable use of tools and materials, and who are believed to be honest. By swapping 
its well known credit for their less known credit the bank performs a service . . . to society 
by economizing tools and materials. Anything which puts these things into the right hands 
and keeps them out of the wrong hands is a gain to the world. The continued existence of 
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The argument about the advantages of a bank based currency would become 
a prominent theme for opponents of silver. Charles Conant’s History of Modern 
Banks of Issue,69 originally published in 1896 and popular enough to run through six 
editions within thirty years (including two after Conant’s death), is a central 
example. Conant’s is a wide-ranging global history, but at least in his first edition 
he was as concerned to put forward the theory of banking currency as he was to 
historicize. His main theoretical theme was that bank-issued notes were both 
necessary and responsibly elastic. Necessity arose from the fact that business 
needs, that is, the commercial need for liquidity, could not be met by gold alone; 
every commercial country required some paper supplement to the supply of coin. 
However, different forms of paper raised different concerns: on the one hand, 
government issued paper was untethered from commercial needs and susceptible 
to inflation; on the other hand, bank issues limited by holdings of government 
securities70 or based on fixed limits71 would lead to seasonal stringency in the 
money market in the best case, and to outright business paralysis in the worst 
case.72 
Bank notes, according to Conant, are the best of all possible currency 
worlds. Unlike coin, they release productive forces that might otherwise be locked 
away in idle hoards; and unlike fiat money, they are not the product of coercive 
government, but rather of a voluntary community: 
In the sense in which government paper money, made by law a legal 
tender for the payment of debt, is a forced loan, for non-commercial 
uses, upon the productive forces of the community, the bank-note, which 
is not forced legal tender, is a voluntary loan, for commercial uses, which 
tends to bring into play, for the mutual benefit of borrowers and lenders, 
the full efficiency of those productive forces.73 
 
a bank is conclusive and incontestable proof that it is doing this thing, for if it were not, its 
own losses and expenses would soon eat it up. 
It has been shown that it is immaterial whether the bank’s credit takes the form of deposits 
or of circulating notes and that the banker cannot decide which form it shall take. The 
bank’s customers alone can decide this question and it is desirable that no impediment 
should be placed in the way of their deciding it, since they will infallibly decide it rightly if 
they are allowed to. 
Id. at 43435. 
69. CHARLES A. CONANT, A HISTORY OF MODERN BANKS OF ISSUE (N.Y.C., G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, The Knickerbocker Press 1896). 
70. Id. at 359. Here, Conant refers to the National Banks in the United States, which could 
issue notes in an amount up to ninety percent of their bond holdings. 
71. Id. at 6. Here the reference is to the limits imposed on the Bank of England in the Bank 
Act of 1844. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. Or in a more flowery formulation:  
The inherent advantage of a currency issued by well regulated banks is its adaptation to 
business needs. It is the outgrowth of the relations of business men with each other and, 
where its essential character has not been too much modified by repressive laws, it 
represents the evolution of the simplest and best methods of making commercial 
exchanges. Being the growth and creature of business transactions, its adaptability to them 
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Further, the danger of inflation or undue contraction is almost nonexistent:  
Inflation by bank-note issues, when banks are required by law and by 
commercial custom to redeem their notes in coin on demand, is not 
conceivable in any such sense as inflation by means of government paper 
money, issued without regard to the demands of business and incapable 
of contraction with the diminution of those demands.74  
And it is not simply the tendency of banking currency to respond to 
commercial needs, but the automatic nature of such a response that recommends 
it: 
A banking currency, when not disturbed by the public authority, except 
to enforce uniformity, safety, and convertibility with coin, is automatically 
responsive to the demands of business. When business is active such a 
currency is expansive in proportion to its needs; when business slackens 
the notes return to their issuers for redemption, the volume of paper 
money is reduced, and the parity of coin and paper is constantly 
maintained.75 
3. Unpacking the Credit Relationship 
Several commentators on the monetary debates of the 1890s pinpointed the 
heart of the issue as the relationship between lenders and borrowers, since 
changes in the value of money seemed to make one group rich at the expense of 
the other.76 And some of the most sophisticated economic work would focus 
precisely on this issue in developing a general account of the stakes of the 
controversy. Thus begins Irving Fisher’s early work, Appreciation and Interest: “The 
chief issues in the bimetallic controversy center about the question of justice between 
debtor and creditor.”77 Fisher had already achieved some renown for introducing 
advanced mathematical techniques into the study of economics, and his stature in 
the economics community has outlasted that of most of his contemporaries, so 
 
is more nearly perfect, of necessity, than other systems originated for other purposes and 
only incidentally shaped to accommodate such needs. It is of prime importance that there 
should be a fixed metallic standard of value, just as it is of importance that there should be 
a fixed length for the meter or yard-stick. The standard being fixed, the duty of the state is 
done and it should be left for the business community to conduct its transactions, so long 
as they are measured by the standard, by the means which it finds most convenient. 
Id. at 554. 
74. Id. at 11. 
75. Id. at 564. The ensuing sentence is telling regarding Conant’s motivations: “The evils of 
government interference with the natural laws of a banking currency are second only to the evils of 
direct issues of government paper money.” Id. at 56465. 
76. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 59; John B. Clark, The Gold Standard of Currency in the Light of 
Recent Theory, 10 POL. SCI. Q. 385 (1895); Cummings, supra note 62; C.M. Walsh, The Steadily 
Appreciating Standard, 11 Q. J. ECON. 280 (1897). 
77. IRVING FISHER, APPRECIATION AND INTEREST 1 (N.Y.C., Am. Econ. Ass’n by the 
Macmillan Co. 1896), reprinted in REPRINTS OF ECONOMIC CLASSICS 1 (Augustus M. Kelly ed., 
N.Y.C., 1961) (emphasis added). 
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some sustained attention to this work seems justifiable. 
Fisher begins his essay by developing a theoretical account of the connection 
between the rate of interest on loans and the fluctuation of the value of money. 
This connection, he contends, is the proper way to reach conclusions regarding 
the question about which economists have become obsessed, namely the just 
standard of deferred payments. Most of that economic writing, according to 
Fisher, has assumed that a just standard must be an invariable one, that is, a 
standard according to which “the principal of a debt when due should be 
equivalent in some way to the original loan,” or according to Ricardo’s 
formulation: “‘A currency to be perfect, should be absolutely invariable in 
value.’”78 But this assumption is not accurate, and a standard need not be 
invariable to be perfect; rather, a standard must simply be dependably predictable, 
“so that contracting parties may be able to forecast all required elements of their 
economic future in terms of that standard as accurately as in terms of any other. If 
a standard is thus dependable, the terms of the contract will be as ‘just’ as they 
could possibly be under any system.”79 As long as the parties can predict in 
advance the fluctuation of the monetary standard, there is no need to scale the 
principal to achieve equivalence (that is, a return of an equivalent of the original 
loan at the time when the debt is discharged): the desired equivalence can be 
secured by adjusting the rate of interest. 
Fisher spends one theoretical chapter showing the mechanics of the 
adjustment of interest on a one-year loan to a predicted change in the value of 
money, measured at first by its change in purchasing power over one 
commodity.80 The ensuing chapters complicate the analysis by treating longer term 
debt, at first with the principal left for repayment at the end of the term, and then 
with the principal paid in installments during the life of the debt. Matching 
installments precisely to fluctuations in the value of money turns out here to 
require minute partial payments (or remissions of interest), but such would not be 
employed in practice, because the overall equivalence is maintained without them. 
“[E]ven if we destroy the precise step-for-step equivalence between the wheat and 
gold tables, we do not destroy their equivalence as a whole. The ‘present values’ 
remain exactly equal.”81 The theoretical chapters are rounded out with discussions 
of variable interest and appreciation and the possibility of negative and zero 
interest. Fisher next turns to an empirical investigation to show that attempts to 
 
78. Id. at 2 (quoting DAVID RICARDO, PROPOSALS FOR AN ECONOMIC AND SECURE 
CURRENCY 714 (London, n. pub. 1816)). Benjamin Andrews begins his Honest Dollar in practically 
the same terms, by quoting at somewhat greater length the same passage from Ricardo’s book. 
ANDREWS, supra note 50, at 1. 
79. FISHER, supra note 77, at 3. 
80. After beginning with a numerical example, he expresses a general formula, and notes that 
to offset appreciation, the rate of interest must be lowered by slightly more than the rate of 
appreciation. Id. at 9. 
81. Id. at 19. 
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adjust interest charges to forecasts about the changes in the value of money 
actually characterize credit relationships. Before delving into the statistics, Fisher 
expresses some market optimism:  
[I]n general, business foresight exists and . . . the accuracy and power of 
this foresight is greater today than ever before. Multitudes of trade 
journals and investors’ reviews have their sole reason for existence in 
supplying data on which to base prediction. Every chance for gain is 
eagerly watched . . . it is the practical man’s business to foresee.82 
Fisher then assesses what many viewed as the heart of the controversy, 
which was the question of whether debtors had actually suffered because of the 
price decline from the 1870s to the 1890s. This question “resolves itself simply 
into the question whether the rate of interest has been properly adjusted.”83 In 
order to answer this question, Fisher uses statistics on the rates of interest on 
government securities in the London market, on bank rates in various countries, 
and on money market rates in various countries, and then compares these interest 
rate statistics with price fluctuations all over the world. The results of the 
investigation are interesting on many levels. First, Fisher shows that the 
divergence between nominal and real interest rates can be significant, and that it 
may explain those periods when nominal interest is high but business is 
nonetheless flourishing.84 Second, Fisher shows that while foresight on the matter 
of the money standard is certainly attempted, the actual adjustment of interest to 
price or wage movements is systematically inadequate, and more so for long than 
for short periods.85 Fisher tries to quantify this inadequacy, reaching a quite 
modest conclusion that debtors were burdened by the appreciation of gold, but 
that “the average debtor’s loss could have been corrected by a reduction in the 
rate of interest of from one-third of one percent to one percent.”86 Fisher was 
well aware that his statistics, based as they are on the bond market, represent the 
actions of those debtors and creditors best placed to attempt adjustment, while 
private debtors are much less likely to understand the mechanics, possess the 
information, or have the bargaining flexibility to pursue such adjustment: “the 
debtor’s losses or gains in these cases are doubtless somewhat greater.”87 
Finally, Fisher reaches the question of applying the theoretical and empirical 
insights onto the actual situation of debtors and creditors. He admits that over the 
course of two decades, “the debtor was on the losing side,” of the maladjustment 
of interest rates to the appreciation of the currency. However, he goes to some 
pains to show that the loss was probably not extensive, and that “it does not seem 
 
82. Id. at 3637. 
83. Id. at 46. 
84. The conclusion comes up in a number of forms, and is discussed explicitly. Id. at 6869. 
85. Id. at 75. 
86. Id. at 73. 
87. Id. at 74. 
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capable of the deep social harm attributed to it,” casting doubt especially on the 
types of aggregates generally used to measure the loss.88 Minimizing the impact of 
the actual appreciation of gold is merely a prelude to Fisher’s next maneuver, 
which is to evaluate the ethics of scaling debts to account for appreciation, and it 
is here that Fisher’s text takes a remarkable turn: 
The fact that debtors have lost does not imply that they have suffered an 
injustice. If a man insures his house and it burns the next day the 
insurance company suffers a loss but not an injustice. If the company 
should ask for legislative relief on the ground that it had not expected so 
sudden a termination of its policy, that the fire was brought about by 
causes which it could not possibly foresee or provide against, it would be 
laughed to scorn. “Keep your contract” would be the reply. It would 
make no difference if the fires were universal, and every insurance 
company lost. Those who assume the risks must take the consequences. 
A farmer mortgages his farm and agrees to pay $1,000 and 5% interest. 
By the terms of the agreement he takes all risks as to what the dollar will 
buy of wheat or anything else. He may lose and all farmers may lose and 
the causes may be in India or Australia or in the sun spots, but we can 
scarcely afford to surrender the ancient principle of the Inviolability of 
Contracts, through sympathy with the misfortunes of any individual man 
or group of men. That elements of risk exist in every contract and that 
this risk implies responsibility are too often ignored.89 
The language of this passage is somewhat fiery in comparison with preceding 
chapters, but it would be a mistake to imagine that it had exploded without 
warning on the text. Instead, it pays to note how methodically the sophistication 
of the economic analysis has been gearing up toward this culmination. From the 
outset, the analysis was honing in ever more on individual calculations of risk and 
reward, fine grained as they might be, and defiant as they might be of general 
trends. Indeed, all attempts at generalization, including the most sophisticated 
indexing techniques, are held up as deeply flawed, highlighting the individual level 
of analysis as the sole area susceptible to accurate statement.90 On the level of the 
individual no one is omniscient, and everyone is a risk taker—whether insurance 
company or farmer; they are all calculating subjects. The farmer who takes a 
mortgage is speculating on the future price of wheat as surely as the insurance 
company speculates on the longevity of its insured. And underwriting the entire 
arrangement is a simple principle synonymous with responsibility and more 
important than sympathy: the inviolability of contract. Inviolability in the face of 
state action, in particular: 
Closely associated with the principle of the Inviolability of Contracts is 
 
88. Id. at 8081. 
89. Id. at 8384. 
90. See id. at 81, 89. 
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the principle against retro-active laws, and in particular, against laws 
which alter existing contracts. The world has reached these principles 
through a long and weary struggle and much costly experience with 
repudiation and the abuses of legal tender. . . . Surely the practical reasons 
against such a course are obvious enough. When once a government has 
undertaken to “correct” debtors’ losses, it will not stop at one 
attempt. . . .  
Legislation to offset the effects of a fall of prices in the past is wrong, 
because retro-active. Legislation to offset the effects of a fall in the future 
is absurd, because we cannot know there will be a fall, and if we could, 
there would be no need of legislation.91 
For a brief moment, Irving Fisher will have the last word, as an exhibit of the 
endpoint of economic discourse on the money question. If Benjamin Andrews 
began with the possibility of global governance of money and ultimate legislative 
responsibility for it, Fisher on the other end of the spectrum drove toward an 
analysis based on the particular relation between two individuals. Anything 
important could be generalized from there, rather than imposed systemically. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
The preceding account of the political and economic debates over the money 
question is, on the one hand, a genuine attempt to present a landscape of 
discourse in which participants would have recognized themselves, and which 
thoughtful students of the period would find plausibly accurate. But on the other 
hand, it has also been an attempt to show the debate in a different light, or to 
serve as evidence for an argument only hinted at earlier, and to be developed here. 
The argument is that the debates over gold, silver, and money in the 1890s 
realigned the relationship of law, economics, and politics to money, and to one 
another. Most of this section will discuss the substantive content of that 
realignment, but I should begin with a caveat from the formal plane. I do not 
claim that the debates over money in the 1890s were the first place where this 
alignment of law, economics, and politics was ever advanced. In some form, and 
on some level of abstraction, the alignment I propose resonates so fully with 
Weberian separation of spheres that it might seem both trivial and long term, 
running from somewhere in the seventeenth century. Perhaps. And yet the 
specificity of the formulations involved here, and the concentration on the money 
form, both seem to call for particular attention. 
This is also, obviously, not the first attempt to make sense of the battle of 
the standards. While this is not the place for a thorough historiographical review, a 
skeletal glimpse of the context may help to clarify the argument. My account is in 
dialogue with three strands in the historical literature, each of which offers a 
 
91. Id. at 8486. 
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different analytic frame for the money question. The first frame is monetary 
history; the second, political history; and the third, cultural history.  
Monetary history, in particular the work of Milton Friedman (with Anna 
Jacobsen Schwartz and alone), supplies perhaps the dominant understanding of 
the developments surrounding the money question in the 1890s. According to this 
strand of work, the political forces at play in the conflict are largely a side show, 
while the main event is economic and technological. Economic forces determine 
the need for liquidity, and in the medium to long term that need will always be 
filled. Thus, the recognized problem of a scarcity of gold in the 1890s holds the 
seeds of its own solution: the scarcity of gold drives up its value, and the higher 
value increases the incentives to find new sources of gold or (and) new processes 
to make mining or refining it cheaper. And in fact, this is precisely what happened: 
the cyanide process and new discoveries after 1896 increased the gold supply, 
which in turn increased liquidity, generated some inflation, and restored 
prosperity. Prosperity obviated money-related agitation, and thus the political 
energies once devoted to the money question simply dissipated.92 Silver backers in 
fact might have had the better arguments in the 1870s, according to Friedman, but 
by the time the value of silver had sunk to 1890s levels, their agitation could only 
have short-term effects like undermining investor confidence. The solution to the 
problem, meanwhile, would rely on economic forces and was basically 
technologically determined. The disappearance of the money question from 
electoral politics is no mystery, according to this account, but the natural result of 
the unfolding of technological progress. 
Political histories, such as those of Gretchen Ritter and Richard Bensel, place 
the conflict between interest groups at the center of their historical frame. Those 
groups derive identity from sectional (i.e., geographical, South and West versus 
Northeast) and sectorial (in the sense of economic sectors—finance; 
manufacturing; and agriculture) interests, and their members share visions of the 
composition of an ideal polity. For such histories, the money question in politics is 
no sideshow, but rather a contest over the desired direction for national economic 
development. Bensel in particular is extremely successful in showing that 
geographical sectionalism and the money question are so deeply intertwined that 
understanding one without the other is nearly impossible. In so doing, he 
translates the money question into longer-range and widely understood narratives 
of American politics, where sectional tensions and those among economic sectors 
 
92. Friedman reiterates this theme in all his discussions of the 1890s. Here is a typical 
formulation: “The price reversal, which farmers had sought to achieve with silver, was produced after 
1897 by the prodigious increase in the international supply of monetary gold. The ‘money’ issue 
retreated from the center of political controversy.” FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, at 119; see 
also MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY MISCHIEF 10425 (1992). For a version of this account as 
encyclopedic orthodoxy, see Hugh Rockoff, Banking and Finance, 1789–1914, in 2 CAMBRIDGE 
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 643, 664–65 (Stanley Engerman & Robert Gallman 
eds., 2000). 
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have always been understood to be central.93  
Cultural histories offer a different vista on the money question. One of the 
opening salvos in this line of work was Walter Benn Michaels’s The Gold Standard 
and the Logic of Naturalism, which drew upon fiction and political discourse to 
analyze deep cultural anxieties manifested in the battle of the standards. Michaels 
innovatively argued that silver and gold advocates were actually on the same side of 
the cultural question, because both set out from a common question: “if there is 
no value in nature, how can there be value at all?”94 According to Michaels, 
supporters of both gold and silver sought to forestall this question by insisting that 
the metals had intrinsic value, and that only money that rested on such intrinsic 
value could avoid becoming simply a “representative” of true value. In denying 
the representative quality of money, both sides on the battle of the standards were 
in effect denying the very nature of money, exposing the strange fact that “gold 
conservatives and silver radicals held in common a view of money that was in 
certain respects more powerful than their differences.”95 Michaels would go on to 
argue that the naturalistic logic that united gold and silver supporters seemed not 
to serve the interests of any individual or group of individuals, but rather the 
interests of the money economy itself.96 More recently, Jackson Lears’s Rebirth of a 
Nation has compellingly revisited the cultural history of the money question. Lears 
does not lose sight of the class basis of the division over the money standard, and 
he repeatedly notes that populists were concerned with ensuring democratic 
control of the money supply.97 However, like Michaels, Lears also locates the real 
conflict as one between a monetary theory resting on a vision of intrinsic values in 
(either of) the metals and a theory recognizing a conventional process of assigning 
 
93. Bensel’s work on the money question is wonderfully rich (too rich to do justice to here), 
and does a great deal to overcome some old prejudices about the silver position being driven by the 
irrationality of cranks. At the same time, Bensel is interested in exploring the type of energy that 
drove the silver position even beyond standard conceptions of interest. For his account of that 
political energy and its manipulation by Bryan in particular, and silver proponents more generally, see 
RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, PASSION AND PREFERENCES: WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN AND THE 
1896 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (2008). 
94. WALTER BENN MICHAELS, THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE LOGIC OF NATURALISM 
154 (1987). 
95. Id. at 146. 
96. Id. at 178. Michaels immediately retreats from this formulation, but not in order to 
reinstate group interests; rather, the attempt is to subvert the primacy of interest itself. In other 
words, the basic argument is that interest group politics cannot make sense of what was actually at 
stake in the arguments over the monetary standard. 
97. So farmers and other debtors took a view of money that was more skeptical than 
their creditors’ faith in its intrinsic value. On the contrary, the indebted classes argued, 
money was nothing more or less than a flexible instrument of value designed to meet 
society’s needs for economic development. A democracy should allow the people to 
manage their own currency, through their representatives, in accordance with their needs. 
Government, from this “fiat money” view, should be able to control the money supply in 
the public interest. 
LEARS, supra note 48, at 151 (in the context of the 1870s). For the parallel claim regarding the 1890s, 
see id. at 185. 
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value, which they attribute to greenbackers or fiat money men.98 
My inquiry runs alongside these three strands of work, though it does depart 
from each on some level. As for Friedman, monetary developments supply my 
main focus. But Friedman’s conviction that the money issue could retreat from 
political controversy simply as the result of an increase in the supply of gold seems 
wanting. It leaves unexplained a change in the language of politics that would 
outlast the euphoria of rising prices after 1897. Bensel’s account of the political 
coalition making and executive branch leadership that sustained the gold standard 
is considerably more compelling. He unearths the distributive basis of political and 
economic developments of the period. What I add to that discussion is the 
analysis of why such distributive politics had to be unearthed—in other words, 
how the dominant position became naturalized and succeeded in presenting itself 
as universalistic rather than distributive. Finally, I accept Michaels’s and Lears’s 
basic insight that much political and economic discourse manifests and in a sense 
displaces cultural anxiety. Likewise, I am convinced that much of the action on the 
cultural plane is, as they both argue, to be found on the level of anxieties about 
subjectivity and the relation of speculation to production. But by placing gold and 
silver advocates on the same side of a cultural divide, these accounts seem to miss 
something of the energy dividing these two groups. Thus, while they may be on 
the same side of one aspect of a cultural struggle, my reading retains their 
antagonism on a basic political plane. At the same time, it seeks to understand the 
political as inflected and perhaps even constructed by the cultural: political 
interests were not settled in advance, but rather built up in the course of the 
conflict; part of that buildup relies on cultural constructions of value, worthiness, 
virtue, and responsibility.99  
Protagonists in the money debates began at different points of departure. 
While both camps in the battle included political advocates and economists, they 
were not evenly balanced. In order to remember that this was not a conflict 
between politics and economics in simple terms (with political discourse taking 
one position, and economists taking another), it pays to think of one side as 
oriented toward political economy, with the other side oriented toward 
microeconomics.  
 
98. Lears’s account covers the shift from the greenback era through the battle of the 
standards, and he uses the overlap to claim that populists in the 1890s were betraying their fiat money 
principles when they joined with the silver advocates during Bryan’s campaign. By the 1890s, 
however, most populists had become silver advocates themselves, and the question for them was 
whether a narrow silver platform or a “middle of the road” or broad-based reform platform was 
preferable. According to either variant, silver was the order of the day. See R. HAL WILLIAMS, 
REALIGNING AMERICA: MCKINLEY, BRYAN, AND THE REMARKABLE ELECTION OF 1896 (2010). 
99.  For an extended discussion of how all of these issues combine in generating 
understandings of value, of money, and of the economy, see MARY POOVEY, GENRES OF THE 
CREDIT ECONOMY: MEDIATING VALUE IN EIGHTEENTH- AND NINETEENTH- CENTURY BRITAIN 
(2008). 
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For much of direct political discourse, and for some of the economic 
discourse (that is, for the political economy camp as a unit), the starting point was 
the entire economic framework, a complete societal arrangement, made possible 
by the existence of money. Keeping one eye on money as a single ingredient in a 
societal arrangement for the distribution of wealth translated into an 
acknowledgment of responsibility (and power) over the mechanics of the money 
system. In general terms, this was a recognition that an economic system was an 
aspect of self-government: a polity chose its mode of distribution, including the 
details of effectuating a distribution. One of the central aspects of that mode of 
distribution was the monetary system.100 More particularly, it translated into a 
claim that the benefit of increased productivity was a social product and its division, 
a question of policy.101 Thus, to the extent that somebody should benefit from the 
increase in productivity and that benefit would be distributed via a change in the 
value of money, a social decision over that distribution was necessary. 
From this vantage point, legislation is the mode of social action. The polity 
works through its representatives in government; government is the human face 
of the state, and the state instantiates popular will in law: legislation is the objective 
of political debate. And law generally is open to functional determination. 
The opposing point of departure characterized some of the political and 
most of the economic discourse. This alternative viewpoint understood money as 
a facilitation of more basic and always resilient underlying economic relations, 
relations that could be conceived simply as barter. Money in and of itself was 
neutral, but it could perform its facilitative role with more or less success. Law, in 
turn, was simply facilitative of money’s own mediating role.102 This basically 
microeconomic figuration conceives law as the backdrop against which money is 
the facilitator of completely individualized action, as it were banishing the 
collective and its politics from the money equation. Money becomes facilitative of 
purely private and wholly individual exchange, endlessly repeated, among all 
individuals. 
The agent of such individualized exchange prices everything, including and 
perhaps especially, his expectations of the value of money. Whether he travels 
 
100. For a succinct articulation of the general claim, see JOHN ROGERS COMMONS, THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 1416 (N.Y.C., Macmillan & Co. 1893). For a lengthier elaboration, with 
money as its focus, see HORTON, supra note 65. 
101. Recall the claim that the decline in prices was caused by declining costs, in turn brought 
on by increased productivity. Even when this claim is accepted, it leaves open the question who 
should gain by the increase in productivity, as seen in the work of economists who divided on the 
answer to that question: “[Bimetallists] ascribe the development of industry to general social causes, 
which raise the grade of labor and augment its value as they enlarge its product. As this is a social 
product, it is a benefit which rightly accrues to every one in so far as he is a producer, and to this 
product no class as such can lay any claim.” SMITH, supra note 59, at 12 (emphasis added); see also 
WALKER, supra note 56, at 28283; Cummings, supra note 62, at 35960.  
102. If advocates of this view often characterized banking as “simple” intermediation, one 
might be tempted to say that their view of the legal would be law as banking. 
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with a portable actuary or not, every contracting party is pricing the likelihood of 
all future events, and indeed, is willing to speculate about everything. “Every good 
citizen should be ready to take his chances in the uncertainties of business. It is 
the manly thing to do.” But speculation, for these advocates, ought to have a limit, 
and that limit is collective action: “But when any party or class of men proposes to 
use the machinery of the government to suddenly and arbitrarily change . . . the 
standard of value . . . an emergency about as serious as that of 1861 is created.”103 
The effect of this branch of the discourse, in both its political and more 
prevalent economic form, is to refigure the role of law. Rather than imagining 
legislation as the objective in a political contest, law is reimagined as the ground, 
the known quantity or accepted baseline for individual action, and as a limitation 
on what politics might even attempt to achieve. It is acknowledged that collectives 
might transgress such limitations, but in this they would be acting more in the 
mode of revolutionaries than as government, and threatening the very foundations 
of society with something like socialism. For this group of commentators, 
“legislation interfering with the natural flow of economical affairs ‘resembles the 
potato-bugs—powerful for evil but powerless for good.’”104 And from here, the 
distance is short to the argument that “the issues involved in the present election 
are not political but economic problems—that they are matters that should not be 
subjects of legislation.”105 
To the modern ear, especially one inured to the music of law and economics, 
this may be a strange posture to square with economics because today’s law and 
economics is so thoroughly instrumentalizing in its attitude toward law: everything 
can be reduced to a welfare function, and law is one particularly useful social tool 
for catering to varying welfare functions. But this was not the posture of the 
economics that became dominant in the late nineteenth-century debates over 
money. One might argue further that it is not the attitude of law and economics 
even today with regard to money. Money, as the ground of comparison that 
enables policy analysis, remains for most accounts tied to the legal at an 
immutable and naturalized baseline. 
The upshot of this analysis is that the effects of the argument over the 
money question are not located primarily in the adoption of the gold standard. 
That is obviously one effect of the debate, or at least of the election results that 
could be seen as the debate’s corollary; however, that result in and of itself would 
still have been compatible with different outcomes regarding the role and 
 
103. FRANCIS E. NIPHER, A PLAIN TALK ON THE SILVER QUESTION 8 (n.p., n. pub. 1896). 
And recall Irving Fisher’s comment quoted earlier: “A farmer mortgages his farm . . . . By the terms 
of the agreement he takes all risks as to what the dollar will buy of wheat or anything else.” FISHER, 
supra note 77, at 84. 
104. A.B. STICKNEY, THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION OF 1896, at 1 (n.p., n. pub. 1896). 
105. Id. at 24. 
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relationships of politics, economics, and law. The more important result, from my 
perspective, is the refiguring of the debate over money as a debate to be 
conducted in economics, rather than in politics. And it would be an economics 
that had left its political economy roots quite far behind. This would be an economics 
dominated by micro-analysis, with interactions examined on the level of individual 
transactors and their individualized incentives and analyses of risk. It would be an 
economics for which the technical analysis of such incentives would reach new 
heights in powerful modeling and elegance, creating (or at least greatly reinforcing) 
a mode of expertise with which it would be difficult to compete. 
On this analysis of the debate, nothing stands or falls on the conclusions 
drawn by economists; everything depends, instead, on the method and the ensuing 
scope of discourse that is established. The advocates of a purely economic analysis 
were for the most part critics of quantity theory; later they would themselves 
reestablish quantity theory as orthodoxy. Their advocacy of gold would later turn, 
for some, into a flirtation with variable standards. But these particular conclusions 
were not actually crucial. Instead, placing economic science at the center of the 
discussion of money, and thus replacing politics as a mode of discourse, was. The 
new figuration would relegate politics (in the context of money) to a partial 
discourse of interest groups. And it would mean that whatever politics were left in 
the money question would have to be dealt with above the fray, or as it were, 
outside politics. Finally, it would require some policing of the boundaries of 
economic speech.106 
Economics was in the midst of establishing itself as a universalizing 
discourse. In the context of the debate over money, it pursued this project on the 
basis of law as a baseline for abstract relations. Only the analysis of such abstract 
relations could offer a serious approach to objectivity. Indeed, by concentrating on 
abstract relations, shutting out the “sympathy with the misfortunes of any 
individual man or group of men,”107 economics would aspire to a model of 
structural objectivity, and with it the authority of scientific expertise.108 Structural 
objectivity was economics’ sympathy with classical legal thought.109 
In sum, the outcome of the debate over money in 1890s America was not 
the gold standard. Instead, it was an understanding of money as an issue to be 
 
106. Benjamin Andrews was nearly driven from his post as President of Brown University 
because his writing on the silver question antagonized university patrons. Economists came to his 
defense, but the content of their defense may actually have “reinforced the notion that economists 
could advocate safely only within a range of accepted doctrines.” FURNER, supra note 49, at 211. J. 
Allen Smith was not as lucky, and was in fact forced out of his job at Marietta College. Id. at 22228. 
107. FISHER, supra note 77, at 84. 
108. For an account of structural objectivity in the sciences, see LORRAINE DASTON & 
PETER GALISON, OBJECTIVITY 253307 (2007). 
109. For an account of the sympathy between neoclassical economics and classical legal 
thought, see Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 
34 AM. U. L. REV. 95861 (1985). 
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determined by economics and away from politics. That particular outcome was the 
product of internal battles within economics as much as it was the result of an 
intense political confrontation. Moreover, the vision of law was at the heart of the 
transformation. From a conception of law as the objective of political struggle, we 
witness a shift to law as a mostly unspoken and natural(ized) baseline for the 
analysis of exchange—from objective, to unchallenged background. It is only 
when this powerful maneuver becomes naturalized and internalized in politics 
itself that the politics of money can move to the narrow plane of finely tuned and 
expert-based regulation of the monetary system. Less than a generation later, the 
Federal Reserve would be the result. But that, of course, is another story. 
 
  
